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Abstract 
This paper focuses on consumer confusion when firms may choose between credible and non-credible certification 
systems for signalling quality. It is shown that the presence of confused consumers leads to the emergence of multiple 
stable equilibria, in which either all firms select the credible certification or all firms select the non-credible 
certification. A situation with numerous confused consumers is characterized by the complete absence of credible 
certification.
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1.  Introduction 
As consumers face different types of certification, they may be confused over the significance of 
claims. Eco-labels with various claims provide an interesting example of possible confusion 
among consumers. So many green claims have emerged that eco-labels have proliferated. Just a 
few of the more well-known labels are the German “Blue Angel”, the “Nordic Swan”, dozens of 
organic certification labels, “Dolphin Safe,” “California Clean,” “Bird Friendly,” “Shade 
Grown,” “Green Seal”. In fact, the Eco-labels Center, a US-based consumer advocacy group, 
lists over 200 US eco-labels across various products on its web site (Eco-labels Center, 2008). 
Among these 200 or so eco-labels that were monitored, many make unsubstantiated claims that 
do not help consumers clarify their opinions. Moreover, these “poor” labels often tarnish the 
credibility of “serious” labels. The different seals linked to labels are often very similar, which 
does not help consumers’ recognition before purchasing goods.  
This paper explores the consequences of consumer confusion over certification systems 
or labels. In a very simple model, two firms choose whether or not to select a costly credible 
certification making a substantiated claim for quality. Under the alternative choice, the non-
credible certification makes unsubstantiated claim for quality. Different certification choices by 
both firms induce consumers’ confusion over the offered quality under each certification system.  
It is shown that the presence of confused consumers when different choices are made by 
firms leads to the emergence of multiple stable equilibria, in which either all firms select the 
credible certification or all firms select the non-credible certification. In comparison, a situation 
without confusion would lead to a unique equilibrium. Moreover, a situation with numerous 
confused consumers is characterized by the complete absence of credible certification that is a 
unique equilibrium.  
The results of this paper differ from previous papers that overlooked confusion despite 
their focus on certification (Lizzeri,1999, Albano and Lizzeri, 2001) or labels (Amacher et al. 
2004, Bonroy and Constantatos, 2008). Lizzeri (1999) and Albano and Lizzeri (2001) show that 
competition among the certification intermediaries can lead to information revelation compared 
to a monopoly situation. This result is unlikely in our framework since consumer confusion 
cripples the revelation process. The present paper also differs from the Wilson’s (1980) paper, 
showing that markets may be characterized by multiple equilibria because of imperfect 
information for all consumers and adverse selection about quality. The present paper differs 
since a situation with only confused consumers is characterized by a unique equilibrium. 
Confusion by only a part of consumers explains the emergence of multiple equilibria.   
The paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces the stylized model. 
Following that, the market equilibrium is detailed. The last section presents some conclusions. 
 
2.  The Model 
In order to focus on the main economic mechanisms and to keep the mathematical aspects as 
simple as possible, the analytical framework is admittedly simple. In this stylized framework, 
trade occurs in a single stage, with two firms able to produce the good. Each firm offers either 
high- or low-quality products. High quality,  0 h s > , implies a (sunk) cost F>0 for a firm and low 
quality   0 L s =  costs zero for simplicity.   2
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where  i x  is the consumer’s consumption of good offered by firms i=1, 2 and v is the quantity of 
a composite good (Garella and Petrakis, 2008).  i s  represents the quality parameter for firm i’ s 
good. The parameter γ  measures the degree of substitutability between the two goods and is 
restricted to lie in the interval [0,1]. Let  i p  denote the unit price for good i, while the price of the 
composite good is normalized to equal one. After normalizing the population of consumers to 
one (for simplicity), maximization of utility defined by (1) with respect to  1 x  and  2 x  gives the 
(inverse) consumer demand functions  ii i j p as x x γ =+− − .  Simultaneously solving these 
inverse demands for xi gives the demand functions,  
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, for i, j =1,2 and i≠ j.     (2) 
In our model each consumer may buy both goods in variable quantities including low-quality 
goods with  0 s = l  since a>0.   
  We turn to the situation under imperfect information, where consumers may receive some 
knowledge about qualities for firms 1 and 2 via certification. There are two types of possible 
certification. Each firm may select a costly credible certification making a substantiated claim 
about the quality of products at a (sunk) cost C, covering the monitoring process and the quality 
inspection. High-quality is signaled by a seal. Low-quality is detected and receives no seal that is 
clearly interpreted as a low-quality signal by consumers. Under the alternative choice, the non-
credible certification makes a poor claim about quality at zero cost. As this cost is zero, a firm 
with low-quality products has an incentive to post this certification, if some consumers are 
confused and wrongfully believe that the firm offer high-quality products. For non-confused 
consumer, this non-credible certification is linked to the low-quality choice.  
  Information about certification choices are received by all consumers at the end of stage 
1. However, when consumers really purchase the good in stage 3, some of them may be confused 
if different certification systems are selected by competing firms. There is a proportion ρ of 
non-confused consumers who clearly identify both types of certification systems. There is a 
proportion (1 ) ρ −  of confused consumers when different certification systems are selected. This 
confusion over the certification definition may come from (i) a lack of knowledge/understanding 
by consumers, (ii) a lack of recall regarding labels between stage 1 (when the information is 
received) and stage 3 (when the good is purchased), (iii) a seals (logos) similarity. These 
confused consumers involuntarily switch the significance of certification, which means that the 
product with the non-credible certification is wrongfully perceived as a product with the credible 
certification and vice versa. When both firms select the same type of certification, there is no 
confusion since consumers perfectly identify a single type of certification used by both firms.
1  
                                                 
1 This assumption is made for simplicity. Extensions could easily consider the consumers’ inability to recall or 
interpret the information when one type of certification is selected and sent by both firms.    3
  The timing of this game is divided into three stages. In stage 1, each firm selects its 
quality level and incurs the sunk cost F if the high quality is selected. Each firm also chooses the 
certification, namely the credible one or the non-credible one. If the credible one is selected, the 
sunk cost C is incurred. At the end of stage 1, information about certification is provided to 
consumers. In stage 2, both firms choose a price. In stage 3, trade occurs with confused and non-
confused consumers who purchase the goods.   
 
3.  The Firm’s Decisions 
The game is solved by backward induction (i.e., subgame Nash equilibrium). When 
purchases are made in stage 3, consumers’ perception about qualities  1
p s  and  2
p s  respectively 
offered by firms 1 and 2 depends on the certification decisions in stage 1. In stage 2, for 
perceived qualities  1
p s  and  2
p s , each firm determines its level of price by taking into account 
other firm’s best reply. The gross profit (without taking into account sunk costs) of a firm i is 
(, , , )
pp
ii i j i j pxpps s  for i, j =1,2; i≠ j. The first order conditions are such that 
** (,,,)
pp
ii ji j x ppss
** * (,,,) / 0
pp
ii i ji j i pxpps s p +∂ ∂=  for i, j =1,2; i≠ j, leading  to equilibrium 
prices  ( )
*2 2 2 (2 ) (2 ) / 4
pp
ii j pa ss γ γγ γ γ ⎡⎤ =− − + − − − ⎣⎦ . Substituting the equilibrium prices in 
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, for i, j =1,2 and i≠ j   (3) 
We now turn to the firms’ decisions regarding the quality and certification choices in 
stage 1. For a firm i, the net profit depends on quality/certification choices implying sunk costs 
and quality perceptions  ,
p p
ij s s   by consumers. For i, j =1,2 and i≠ j, Yi is an indicator variable 
taking the value of 1 if firm i chooses high-quality products and zero if low quality is chosen. Zi 
is an indicator variable taking the value of 1 if firm i chooses the credible certification and zero if 
non-credible certification is chosen. The profit for a seller i is 
1 (, , , ) ( , )
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     (4) 
A few details are now provided about quality perceptions. When firms have the same 
certification strategy  ij Z Z =  , there is no consumer confusion. The quality perception is 
pp
ij ss == h s  if  1 ij ZZ ==  and  1 ij YY == . The quality perception is 
pp
ij ss = =0 if  0 ij ZZ ==  
whatever  , ij YY, because consumers believes the quality is low when all firms choose non-
credible certification. With different certification strategies, let assume that firm 1 chooses high-
quality  h s  and a credible label ( 1 1 Y =  and  1 1 Z = ), while firm 2 chooses the non-credible 
certification ( 2 0 Z = ). A proportion ρ  of non-confused consumers clearly identify the different   4
seals, and their demands are  112 (,,, 0 ) h xpps  for firm 1 with high quality  h s  and  221 (,, 0 ,) h x pp s 
for firm 2 with low quality equal to zero (see equation (2) for details about demands). A 
proportion (1 ) ρ −  of confused consumers involuntarily switch the significance of certification, 
which means that the product with the non-credible certification is wrongfully perceived as a 
product with the credible certification and vice versa. For these confused consumers, the 
demands are  112 (, , 0 ,) h x pp s for firm 1 (wrongfully perceived with low-quality equal to zero) and 
221 (,,, 0 ) h xpp s  for firm 2 (wrongfully perceived with high-quality  h s ). By using (2) and the 
proportions of non-confused and confused consumers, the expected demand  1 q  for firm 1 (and 
similarly  2 q  for firm 2 by using x2) is  112 112 (,,, 0 )( 1 )(,, 0 ,) hh xpps xpp s ρ ρ + −=  
112 (,, , ( 1 )) hh x pp s s ρ ρ − . For firm 1, the overall profit is determined by (4) with  12 1, 0 ZZ == . 
  Various situations may emerge at the equilibrium depending on the parameters values. 
The subgame-perfect equilibrium is characterized by the absence of individual deviation by any 
firm. Figure 1 represents the game at stage 1 by reducing this stage to a 4×4 normal-form game, 
where two firms simultaneously choose one of 4 actions, namely (high quality, low quality)× 
(credible certification, non-credible certification).  






















































1(1,0,1,1) Π 1 1 Y =
1 1 Z =
1 1 Z =
1 1 Z =
1 1 Z =
1 0 Z =
1 0 Z = 1 0 Z =
1 0 Z =
2 0 Z =
2 1 Z = 2 1 Z =
2 1 Z = 2 1 Z = 2 0 Z =
2 0 Z = 2 0 Z =
1 0 Y =
2 1 Y = 2 0 Y =
 
The row player is the firm 1 with the profit  11 12 2 (, , , ) YZYZ Π  in the cell corresponding to   5
strategies  11 22 ,,, YZYZ, and the column player is the firm 2 with the profit  22 211 (, ,,) YZYZ Π  in the 
cell corresponding to strategies  22 11 ,, , YZYZ . The quality choice (Yi ) determines the choice 
among matrixes and the certification choice (Zi ) determines the choice inside each matrix.  
With figure 1, the elimination of dominated strategies can be made for firm 1 (and 
symmetrically for firm 2). We restrict our attention to the second column of the left matrixes for 
which the firm’s 2 strategy ( 22 1, 1 YZ == ) is given. Thus, for firm 1, the strategy ( 11 1, 0 YZ == ) 
is strictly dominated by the strategy ( 11 0, 0 YZ = = ), since the profit  1(1,0,1,1) Π = 
1((1 ) , ) hh ss F C π ρρ −− −  is strictly lower than the profit  11 (0,0,1,1) ((1 ) , ) hh ssC π ρρ Π =− − . 
Moreover, the strategy ( 11 0, 1 YZ == ) fully revealing low quality because of the absence of seal 
under credible certification is strictly dominated by the strategy ( 11 0, 0 YZ = = ), since the profit 
11 (0,1,1,1) (0, ) h sC π Π=−  is strictly lower than the profit  11 (0,0,1,1) ((1 ) , ) hh ss π ρρ Π =− . The 
strategies ( 11 1, 1 YZ == ) and ( 11 0, 0 YZ == ) are non-dominated and the ranking between 
1(0,0,1,1) Π  and  1(1,1,1,1) Π  depends on parameter values F, C andρ . 
The previous demonstration can be replicated for other columns and for other rows when 
deviations of firms 2 are considered. In figure 1, the profits linked to non-dominated strategies 
are circled with dashed lines. The comparison of these profits delineates the emergence of 
equilibrium. Figure 2 is useful for illustrating the choices by firm(s) at the equilibrium among the 
strategies for which profits are circled in Figure 1. These choices are detailed in proposition 1. In 
figure 2, the proportion of non-confused consumers,ρ , is located along the horizontal axis, and 
the cost of the credible certification, C, is located along the vertical axis. 
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Proposition 1. There is a unique equilibrium in the following regions: 
-  Both firms choose high-quality products with a credible certification in region 1. 
-  Both firms choose low-quality products with a non-credible certification in region 3. 
-  One firm chooses high-quality products with a credible certification and the other 
firm choose low-quality products with a non-credible certification in region 4.   
There are multiple equilibria in region 2, for which either both firms choose high-quality 
products with a credible certification or both firms choose low-quality products with a non-
credible certification. 
 
Proof: The profits linked to non-dominated strategies and circled with dashed lines in 
figure 1 are compared. The selection of high-quality products with a credible certification by 
both firms is a subgame perfect equilibrium, if  11 (1,1,1,1) (0,0,1,1) Π >Π , which is equivalent to 
11 1 (,) ( ( 1 ), ) hh h h CC s s F s s π πρ ρ <= − − − . This constraint  1 CC <  is similar for firm 2 with 
22 (1,1,1,1) (0,0,1,1) Π> Π . The constraint  1 CC <  means that there is no profitable deviation for a 
firm that chooses high-quality when the competitor also chooses high-quality. 
The selection of low-quality products with a non-credible certification by both firms is a 
subgame perfect equilibrium, if   11 (0,0,0,0) (1 ,1 ,0,0) Π> Π , which is equivalent to 
21 1 (, ( 1) ) ( 0 , 0 ) hh CC s s F πρ ρ π >= − − − . This constraint means that there is no profitable 
deviation (associated with both credible certification and high-quality products) for a firm that 
chooses low-quality when the competitor also chooses low-quality. 
The regions of figure 1 are determined as following. For 
22
2 (2 )/(2 ) ρ ργγ γ >= − + −, 
the relationship  21 CC >  is satisfied. Region 4 with strategies described in proposition 1 is 
defined by  12 CC C << . 
For  12 ρρ ρ << (with 
2
1 /(2 ) ρ γγ γ =+ − ), the relationship  21 CC <  is satisfied. It means 
that for   21 CC C << in region 2, there are multiple equilibria, since both firms select high-
quality products with credible certification if  1 CC <  or both firms select low-quality products 
with non-credible certification if  2 CC > . 
For  1 ρρ > , region 1 is defined by  12 [, ] CM i n C C < . For 01 ρ ≤ ≤ , region 3 is defined by 
12 [,, 0 ] CM a x C C > , with  1 0 C <  and  2 0 C <  for  1 ρ ρ <  . 
Ñ 
 
The firms’ choices depend on the cost of the credible certification. In region 1, for 
12 [, ] CM i n C C < , then the credible certification leading to high-quality products is selected by 
both sellers, because of a relatively low cost of credible certification. Conversely, a relatively 
high cost of credible certification deters firm(s) from using the credible certification. In region 4, 
namely for a cost,  12 CC C << , then the credible certification is selected by only one seller with   7
the other one selecting the non-credible certification. With ρ  close to one, only a few consumers 
are confused over the certification, which does not deter firms from differentiating the 
certification systems. In region 3, namely for a cost, 12 [, ] CM a x C C > , then the credible 
certification is not selected and only the non credible certification leading to low-quality 
products is selected by both sellers. Numerous confused consumers ( 1 ρ ρ < ) lead to the absence 
of credible certification 
The confusion increases the incentive for the firm 2 to free ride the credible certification 
by avoiding the higher cost C of a credible certification compared to the non-credible 
certification. In region 2, there is a multiplicity of equilibria, in which either all firms select the 
credible certification or all firms select the non-credible certification. The related mechanism 
depends on the absence of individual deviation by one firm. For  1 CC < , corresponding to 
11 (1,1,1,1) (0,0,1,1) Π> Π , then one firm individually chooses the credible certification when the 
other firm chooses the credible certification, which defines a stable equilibrium. For  2 CC > , 
corresponding to  11 (0,0,0,0) (1 ,1 ,0,0) Π> Π , one firm chooses the non-credible certification 
when the other firm chooses the non-credible certification, which defines a stable equilibrium. 
Thus for C such that  21 CC C << (in region 2), both equilibria may emerge.  
This multiplicity comes from the change in the incentive to individually deviate from an 
equilibrium situation, because of the confusion with different choices regarding the certification. 
Indeed, when ρ decreases, the profits linked to the deviation move in an opposite direction since 
1(, ( 1) ) hh ss πρ ρ −  decreases explaining the decrease of  2 C  and  1((1 ) , ) hh ss πρ ρ −  increases 
explaining the decrease of  1 C .  In figure 1, the frontier  2 C  becomes lower than  1 C  since the 
variation of  1(, ( 1) ) hh ss π ρρ −  in absolute value is larger than the variation of  1((1 ) , ) hh ss π ρρ − . 
Note that the multiplicity only emerges because of the deviation profit that depends on the 
proportion (1 ) ρ −  of confused consumers. Under both equilibria in area 2, no individual 
deviation is profitable because of consumers’ confusion.  
In comparison to previous situations with confusion (for  1 ρ < ), a situation without 
confusion would lead to situations with a unique equilibrium (namely, for  1 ρ =  represented by 
the dashed and vertical line in figure 2). For  1 CC <  (with  1 C  equal to  1 C  when  1 ρ = ), the 
choice of high-quality with credible certification would be selected by both firms under the 
absence of confusion (with  1 ρ = ), while, with  1 ρ < , the choice of low-quality products may be 
selected in region 2 and is selected in region 3. In such a context, there is a role for regulation 
that would consist to impede the non-credible certification system. Such a ban would impede the 
use of any certification by firms with low-quality products.  
 
4.  Conclusion 
Using a very stylized framework, we showed the impact of consumers’ confusion on market 
mechanisms.  
  In order to focus on the main economic mechanisms and to keep the mathematical   8
aspects as simple as possible, the analytical framework was admittedly simple. In order to fit 
different problems coming from various contexts, some extensions could be integrated into the 
model presented here.
 As the analysis was performed under duopoly, this paper can be a starting 
point for future research on the same issue in an oligopoly context with many firms and/or many 
labels possibilities reinforcing confusion and proliferation. The possibility of imperfect 
monitoring linked to the credible certification would reinforce the absence of high-quality as in 
region 3 of figure 2. The difficult/unlikely emergence of high levels of quality when numerous 
consumers are confused could be observed when firms may choose multiple quality levels. 
Eventually, the consumers’ knowledge belief could be much more complex or the incentive of 
certifiers could be also studied. 
  However, despite limitations, this simple model suggests that it is especially imperative 
for firms or governments to examine consumers’ confusion/knowledge when private or public 
certification systems are selected. 
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